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Abstract: 
Almost two decades after the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, opinions differ in 
terms of its effectiveness in fostering peace and reconciliation. Although the number of deaths 
linked to the conflict has sharply decreased since the signing of the agreement, a series of recent 
political developments have underlined some inadequacies within the current framework. Within 
academia, the two opposing schools of thought, namely consociationalism and integrationism, 
have been engaged in a debate regarding the empirical case of Northern Ireland and how it relates 
to current political science theory on conflict resolution in multi-ethnic states. This paper proposes 
an argument for a more nuanced theoretical approach to peacemaking by exploring two political 
issues that have been particularly problematic in Northern Ireland following the implementation of 
the Agreement. By analyzing the issues of integrated education and of the Irish language through 
the lens of both consociationalism and integrationism, I plan to further advance the theoretical 
debate in addition to providing relevant academic research applicable to the case of Northern 
Ireland. The inclusion of research and literature from a variety of disciplines allows for a more 
evidence driven approach to understanding the challenges facing the Northern Irish peace process 
today.  
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Introduction: 
 
The sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland have been entrenched in the local society ever 
since partition in 1920; in that regard, the conflict that broke out in the late 60s known as “the 
Troubles” was by no means an unexpected turn of events. Up until the civil rights movement, the 
Protestant majority governed with little resistance; all levers of power were controlled by 
Protestants and Catholic discrimination was rampant. Ever since the establishment of the new 
state, the civil service was controlled by Protestants, with Catholics making up only 10% of the 
lowest position within the civil service (McKittrick & McVea 2002). The violent unrest that followed 
this period of sectarian division known as “the Troubles” led to the deaths of about 3800 people in a 
total population of less than 1.5 million people, and a legacy of mutual hate that seemed impossible 
to overcome. In 1972 alone, almost 500 people lost their lives as a result of the conflict, a year that 
would go down as the bloodiest of all the Troubles. Despite the volatile situation and death toll 
throughout the 90s, a large breakthrough in the peace process came in the form of the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA). This power sharing agreement, signed in 1998, was designed to ease tensions 
and provide a framework for long term stability through a series of democratic institutions 
operating in a bi-sectarian manner. It was based on the principle of consent that adopted, to a 
certain extent, the aspirations of both ethnoreligious groups. In article 2 of the agreement, all 
signatories are expected to adhere to the principle that no change in the status of Northern Ireland 
can be achieved without “a consent of the majority of its people” (Good Friday Agreements 1998). 
This finely calibrated statement encompasses both the aspiration for a United Ireland expressed by 
Catholic nationalists as well as the firm belief held by Protestant unionist that they, as the majority, 
should ultimately be masters of their own fate. The years that followed the establishment of the 
agreement constitute irrefutable evidence of its effectiveness: since 1999, the number of deaths has 
not surpassed 20 and has steadily declined, with 2008 being the first year with no conflict related 
casualties since the early 60s (see Figure 1). To this day, the number of annual confirmed sectarian 
killings linked to paramilitary groups remains under 5. Despite a small number of casualties 
persisting to this day, the Good Friday Agreements has undoubtedly contributed to an 
environment of relative stability with the avoidance of large scale paramilitary violence. 
Nevertheless, the gradual decrease in violence was not the only breakthrough spearheaded by the 
agreement; the years following its implementation saw a considerable shift away from para-
militarism and into the political scene. Parties with a long-standing tradition of endorsing 
paramilitary violence during the Troubles found a way to channel their discontent by political 
means, something previously thought to be unachievable.  
 
 Despite the relative success of the agreement in allaying the death toll of this internecine 
dispute, a series of long standing issues have continuously vitiated Northern Irish politics. Among 
them is the highly divisive issue of the Irish language and integrated education; In January 2017, the 
decision of the Unionist Agriculture minister to rename a boat from Irish to English triggered a 
considerable backlash by the Nationalists who saw it as an attack on the Irish language (The 
Journal 2017). The nationalist party of Sinn Fein has long argued for the implementation of an Irish 
Language act similar to those in place in Scotland, Wales and the Republic of Ireland. This would, 
in turn, mean that official documentation, parliament debates and justice should be provided in the 
Irish language, at the expense of the state. The framework for the promotion of the Irish language 
provided by the Good Friday Agreements remains relatively vague and is thus subject to a lot of 
controversy on both sides. In the case of education, the ambiguity of the Good Friday Agreements 
has led, once again, to a lack of decisive action from the government in order to ensure the wider 
availability of integrated education. What is more puzzling is perhaps the fact that a considerable 
part of parents (74%) in Northern Ireland support the promotion of integrated education and 
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would opt for the option if it was available (McGlynn et al. 152). The extent of the divide in 
education is, to put it mildly, alarming. In 2012, 91% of Protestant children attended controlled, 
majority protestant schools (Torney 2012).  Similarly, 88% of Catholic children attended Catholic 
controlled schools (Torney 2012), with the percentages remaining high to this day, with around 
90% of students educated separately.  
 
 In the light of this seemingly complex and disconcerting political reality, an academic 
debate has flourished around the case study of Northern Ireland, with the two opposing schools of 
thought attempting to adopt the Northern Irish peace process as their “poster boy”. Although 
integrationists and consociationalists are both in favor of the power-sharing agreement, the 
theoretical approach, aspirations and end goals on either side differ considerably.  This 
disagreement in theoretical terms leads to a number of different positions and solutions proposed 
by each school of thought. Consociationalism (or segregationism) is based on the principle that 
minimizing contact between groups is the only way to ensure relative peace and avoid large scale 
violence. As opposed to that, integrationists hold the assumption that power sharing agreements 
such as the one in Northern Ireland provide a basis for further social integration and thus long 
term peace. In the issue of education, this leads each side to propose radically different solutions: it 
should come as no surprise that consociationalists wouldn’t like to see any radical change to the 
current system. Their assumption that additional group contact through education has the 
potential to create tensions is enough to deter them from encouraging the development of 
integrated education. Nevertheless, a growing body of evidence from both Northern Ireland and 
abroad establishes a link between integrated schooling and an altering of identity and mutual 
perception of ethnic groups, suggesting that educational reform along integrationist lines holds the 
key to long term reconciliation (McGlynn et al. 2007). As opposed to that, research done regarding 
linguistic integration of minority languages underlines the limits that such an approach can have, 
especially in the context of a fractured multi-ethnic state. A fully fledged linguistic integration as 
advocated by integrationists is, as I will argue, unrealistic in the case of Northern Ireland. A 
nuanced theoretical approach to peace and power-sharing remains essential and should be adopted 
on a case to case basis in the light of academic evidence. As I will try to demonstrate, none of the 
existing frameworks fully encompasses the complexity of the case study.  
 
 In the context of this thesis, I plan to indulge in an understanding of two intractable 
political issues that have been the source of much discontent. By relating these issues to both the 
theoretical discussion and the Good Friday Agreement, I plan to provide a deeper practical 
understanding through the use of both data and empirical evidence. These reflections will 
ultimately be linked to the theoretical discussion between integrationists and consociationalists 
regarding conflict resolution and provide a basis for further discussion. Firstly, I will present a brief 
historical background of the conflict that is crucial in understanding the peace process. I will then 
proceed by giving a concise review of the literature and methodology in addition to an analysis of 
the Good Friday Agreement. By presenting a contextual view of the agreement from both the 
integrationist and consociational lens, I will present the overview of the current theoretical debate 
and its relevance in the case of Northern Ireland. That will be followed by the core of my argument 
which includes the analysis of the previously mentioned political issues (Integrated education and 
the Irish language) in the theoretical and historical context with the use of relevant data and 
research. The Chapter on the Irish language will include an ample amount of information regarding 
recent political developments and how they relate to my argument regarding the integration of the 
Irish language.  
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Historical Perspectives: The Troubles 
 
Before indulging in any analysis of the Northern Irish peace process or political 
developments, it is of crucial importance to shed light on the historical developments of the 
conflict. As previously mentioned, the ethnoreligious tensions that exploded after 1969 were the 
product of a long history of sectarian divisions and injustices. Ever since the establishment of the 
Northern Irish state in 1920, violence was rampant, with the two years following the partition of 
Ireland leading to 428 deaths by sectarian violence throughout the newly founded state (McKittrick 
& McVea 4).  Northern Ireland was established as a Protestant majority state conceived to 
accommodate the descendants of Scottish and English settlers that had moved to the island of 
Ireland following the battle of Boyne and the Protestant ascendancy. Despite being a considerable 
minority of upwards of 500 000, Catholics were held away from political power, often with very 
questionable means. One such example of political isolation took place in the second largest city of 
Londonderry, of which the population was primarily made up of Catholics. Before the 1936 local 
election and with Unionists in dire straits over the possibility of losing the local council to 
Nationalists, the Northern Irish government based in the Stormont parliament in Belfast applied a 
system of boundary manipulation in order to ensure that the 7500 Protestant voters would elect 
more representatives than the 10000 Catholics living in the city (McKittrick & McVea 8). This 
system came to be known as “gerrymandering” and would play a significant role in the later civil 
rights movement that gained popularity among the Catholic population. In local elections, suffrage 
was exclusively for landowners: citizens living in rented space or young adults living with their 
parents were excluded from the voting process. Similarly, in 1922, the proportional representation 
system put in place by the British in the 1920 Ireland act was replaced by a “first past the post” 
system with redrawn electoral maps constructed to maintain unionist control. Although the level of 
electoral gerrymandering is debated, the electoral reforms did lead to a considerable number of 
local councils being lost by Nationalists in the 1922 election (J. Whyte 1983). Nationalists were 
manipulated out of local government control through the reform of electoral boundaries (J. Whyte 
1983). Terence O’Neill’s arrival at the position of prime minister of Northern Ireland came with an 
inheritance of sectarian inequalities, structural imbalances and societal tensions: Catholics had 
effectively given up hope in the political process and faced crucial difficulties in employment. These 
circumstances had effectively set the stage for the decades of vicious violence that erupted. With an 
alienated Catholic minority isolated from the corridors of political power and a Protestant majority 
under a constant fear of finding themselves reunited with Ireland against their will, it was a matter 
of time until the Pandora’s Box was eventually opened and centuries of suppressed tensions 
surfaced.    
 Under the presidency of Terence O’Neill, cracks started to appear in the social fabric of the 
Northern Irish state. The establishment of the Campaign for Social Justice in 1963 marked the 
beginning of the civil rights movement, characterized as a majority catholic movement for equality. 
In addition to the growing unrest among the Catholic population came the election of a labor 
government in the Westminster. Prime Minister Harold Wilson made it clear, early in his mandate, 
that the issue of Northern Ireland was to be addressed with caution and determination after a 
portion of his party launched the “Campaign for democracy in Ulster” initiative, drawing attention 
to problems in Northern Ireland (McKittrick &McVea 37). The attempts of O’Neill to reshape the 
political structures and deliver reforms needed to avoid the conflict were largely unsuccessful. On 
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one hand, Unionist hardliners like Ian Paisley and others in the Stormont assembly mounted an all-
out offensive against any cessation or change in the system. On the other hand, leaders of the civil 
rights movement and the Catholic minority as a whole remained skeptical of both his true 
intentions as well as his ability to deliver on his promises (McKittrick & McVea 52). The two years 
following O’Neill’s resignation and the arrival in power of James Chichester Clark would lead to an 
escalation of the violence and some of the bloodiest years on record. In 1972, the death toll rose to 
497 people, the highest during the entire Troubles. The situation had effectively escalated out of 
control: the decision of Faulkner (the newly elected prime minister) to use interment without trial 
in 1971 as a way to de-escalate the security situation had completely backfired. The operation 
codenamed “Operation Demetrius” was launched, targeting numerous Provisional IRA members 
and aimed at dismantling the paramilitary group. The inaccurate records led to the accidental 
arrests of uninvolved civilians, a miscalculations that, in turn, led to greater radicalization among 
Catholic youth (McCleery 2015). The question of whether the right people were indeed interned is a 
hotly debated issue, the jailed suspects would later create a point of friction during the peace 
negotiations, particularly around the legal status of prisoners affiliated with paramilitary groups. 
Incidents like Bloody Sunday and the numerous bombings by the IRA would escalate the violence 
and lead to an eventual “takeover” of political power by the British government and the temporary 
abolition of the Stormont parliament.  
 The first attempt to establishing peace came in the form of the Sunningdale agreement in 
1974. In a multilateral negotiation in late 1973, the three main parties that would later form the 
executive along with the British and Irish governments, began drawing the plan for a power-sharing 
agreement that would bring an end the rampant violence (McKittrick & McVea 95). Under the 
initiative of the then Secretary of state for Northern Ireland William Whitelaw, some considerable 
compromises were achieved; with the establishment of the Council of Ireland, some advisory 
powers were provided to the Irish government. The Irish government had to, in turn, clarify its 
intensions by stating that it did not condone of any change of status for Northern Ireland without 
the consent of the majority of the people. This principal of consent would later be the founding 
stone of the Good Friday Agreements. Nevertheless, unlike the Good Friday Agreements, the 
Sunnigndale Agreement was short-lived. The power-sharing government that included the Catholic 
SDLP party collapsed in May 1974 under the mounting pressure of a large scale Unionist strike that 
had brought the country to its knees (Melaugh 2010). The outright rejection of the agreement by a 
considerable part of Unionism had effectively thrown Northern Ireland back into stalemate and 
sectarian conflict with paramilitary groups intensifying their campaigns of violence. Following the 
crisis, the political scene had fragmented considerably, with the resigning Prime Minister Faulkner 
having lost the control of his own party, the UUP. The DUP, formed in 1971 by Ian Paisley, was 
gaining ground among Protestant voters. In 1975, the Constitutional Convention set up by the 
British government to establish a platform for the discussion on the Status of Northern Ireland, saw 
15 members of the DUP elected (DUP 2017). Around 1977, the IRA was going through a period of 
instability, as newer members of the organization slowly replaced the aging leadership of O 
Bradaigh and O Conaill. The arrival of Martin McGuiness and Gerry Adams initiated a shift in IRA 
policy, the political wing of the IRA, known as Sinn Fein, was gaining ground after the 1975 IRA 
ceasefire. The total abstinence from the political arena was slowly transitioning to a presence in 
both politics through Sinn Fein and the continuing paramilitary struggle with the IRA. In the years 
that followed, Republican violence continued, leading to the deaths of numerous innocent civilians.  
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 The arrival of Margaret Thatcher at Downing Street saw a political breakthrough in the 
peace process, in what would come to be known as the Anglo Irish Agreement. Following bilateral 
negotiations between Thatcher and Haughey in 1981 and later with FitzGerald, the agreements 
essentially established a framework of cooperation between the two main actors. The agreement 
provided the ability of the Irish government to participate in the running of Northern Ireland 
through a series of measures such as the intergovernmental conference (Anglo Irish Agreement 
1985). This platform allowed the Irish government to provide policy proposals regarding Northern 
Ireland and discuss these issues with the British government (Anglo Irish Agreement 1985). 
Although this didn’t offer the possibility of joined rule as some Republican circles had hoped, it did 
offer more than an “advisory” role to the Irish government. Once again, the agreement was met 
with a fierce Unionist response. Nevertheless, the numerous strikes and political boycotts were 
insufficient in bringing about the collapse of the agreement which remained in place throughout 
the 80s and the peace process in the 90s. It is important to note that the Anglo Irish Agreement 
only provided a platform for cooperation between the British and Irish government, it did not 
entail any changes to the running of Northern Irish assembly which was still under abolition. Home 
rule from Westminster lasted from 1972 all the way to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 
1998.       
 The late 80s and early 90s were dominated by IRA attacks on strategic British targets; the 
arming of the IRA by the Gadhafi regime had provided them with a series of powerful weapons that 
allowed them to continue waging their campaign of violence. The Libyan weapon shipments 
included semtex explosives, Romanian variants of the AK47, Mortars, Anti-aircraft weaponry and 
other military grade equipment (The Telegraph 2011). It was by using some of this equipment that 
the IRA perpetrated some devastating attacks on the British Mainland; the mortar strike on 
Downing street and the Bishopsgate bombing just to name a few. The unexpected IRA ceasefire in 
August 31st 1994 brought back hope for peace throughout Northern Ireland, with the 
announcement being met with celebrations in the Catholic neighborhoods of Belfast and 
Londonderry (BBC 1994). The years of peace negotiation that followed were instrumental in the 
establishment of the Good Friday Agreement and will be discussed further in the following 
chapters.  
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Literature Review: 
 
 The literature relevant to my thesis encompasses a series of different disciplines worth 
taking into consideration; since the core of my argument consists of an analysis of both the 
educational system and language policy, relevant research from the fields of education studies, 
social psychology, political science and sociolinguistics will be utilized. The research regarding the 
above mentioned aspects of Northern Irish politics will be done within a theoretical framework 
firmly based in political science. This framework is, as previously mentioned, centered on power 
sharing in multi-ethnic societies. By taking into consideration both Consociational and 
integrationist theory of power sharing and conflict resolution, I will be providing a theoretical 
insight into political developments all while contributing to the academic debate. The goal is to 
adopt a wide array of literature from a variety of disciplines in order to enrich and critically assess 
the existing political science theoretical ideas in the context of the Good Friday Agreement. 
 For the numerous historical information and references I will be using throughout my 
thesis, I will utilize a variety of well reputed sources in order to ensure the relative objectivity of 
historical accounts. The book Making sense of the Troubles (2001) by Journalist David McKittrick 
and Historian David McVea provides a precise historical account of the conflict by covering the full 
chronological period and including a variety of interviews and publications from both sides. The 
book also includes a variety of relevant statistical data both prior to and after the Good Friday 
Agreement. In addition to the book, the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) by Ulster 
University provides a series of historical accounts and academic research on the topic of the 
Northern Irish conflict. The contribution by authors from different sectarian backgrounds to the 
CAIN archives also ensures a less biased take on historical accounts.  In terms of primary sources, a 
variety of them will be usedthroughout my thesis, particularly the official text of the Good Friday 
Agreements (1998) and the later St Andrews agreement (2006) that was meant to address some 
shortcomings of the official 1998 document. Other official publications like the Irish and British 
constitution will be relevant in the context of the discussion, considering that a part of the GFA was 
conceived simply to address constitutional issues in the respective countries.    
 The literature surrounding conflict resolution in multi-ethnic societies is quite vast and 
largely inconsistent; severe fragmentation persists in terms of schools of thought and competing 
theoretical explanations. In the context of democratic societies, two competing views remain most 
dominant; namely Consociationalism and Integrationism. It is also important to acknowledge that, 
in the various literature studied in the context of this thesis, terminology referring to the 
Integrationist/Consociational framework is often incoherent; a variety of terms are being used to 
describe each particular phenomenon. Integrationism is also referred to as civil society power-
sharing or social transformation and Consociatonalism is sometimes referred to as 
“accommodation” or “segregationism”. In the context of some academic texts, Consociationalism is 
simply used to describe power-sharing in democratic societies as a whole. Despite these facts, in 
many articles including this thesis, it will be used to refer to a specific type of power-sharing that 
will be more thoroughly analyzed at a later stage. 
In the case of Consociationalism, scholars like Arend Lijphart with his book Democracy in 
Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (1977) form the cornerstone of consociational theory 
along with John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. Their political analysis of the Northern Irish 
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conflict titled Consociational theory, Northern Ireland Conflict and its Agreement (2006) provides a 
very well rounded insight into the theoretical debate surrounding the Northern Irish conflict and 
the subsequent Good Friday Agreement. Other refinements to Consociational theory with regard to 
the Northern Irish conflict were presented by Tilley & al in their study Consociationalism and the 
Evolution of Political Cleavages in Northern Ireland (2008), which provided a strong argument for 
the importance of Consociational power-sharing institutions in the de-escalation of divisive 
rhetoric, mostly in regards to traditionally extreme parties like the DUP and Sinn Fein. Studies like 
the one conducted by Gurr titled Why Minorities rebel (1993) provided a considerable amount of 
empirical validation to the theory; as observed in the context of the study, established democracies 
that allow for well institutionalized cultural autonomy have a reduced risk of rebellion by minority 
groups. This was observed across a series of more than 200 ethnic conflicts and rebellions across 
the globe. Similarly, in a study named The Spending power in Federal Systems (1998) by Watts, the 
author establishes another link between local government autonomy and stability, mostly in regard 
to the Francophone population of Quebec in Canada. Other theoretical literature such as The 
Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational engagements (2004) by McGarry provide a deep 
understanding of Consociational theory applied to Northern Ireland while also highlighting the 
apparent shortcomings of the theory. 
 In terms of Integrationist theory (or Accommodation as it often referred to), a variety of 
academics have developed comprehensive arguments, particularly in response to the dominance of 
consociationalism. Donald Horowitz in his article Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear 
Consociational and Risky (2001) firmly criticizes the Consociational approach to Northern Irish 
conflict and argues for a more integrationist take on power-sharing across both communities. 
Similarly, this critical approach to Consociationalism in the context of Northern Ireland was further 
pursued by Political scientist Rupert Taylor in his articles The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of 
Consociationalism: A Critique (2006) and Northern Ireland: Consociation or Social Transformation? 
(2001). In both these articles, Taylor lays some of the fundamental theoretical tools and arguments 
in favor of Integrationism, by providing statistical evidence of an emerging Northern Irish identity 
(Taylor 223). Other academics like Paul Dixon in his article Why the Good Friday Agreement in 
Northern Ireland is Not Consociational (2005) take a more radical approach in rejecting 
Consociational theory as inherently divisive due to the importance placed by consociationalists on 
segregation and separation of power. Finally, Ian Lustick in his fierce critic of Lijphart and his 
article Consociationalism Lijphart, Lakatos and Consociationlism (1997) provides further empirical 
evidence for an integrationist approach to conflict resolution by mentioning India as an example of 
a democratic state defying consotiational assumptions (Lustick 115). It is important to note that 
most of the theoretical literature surrounding integrationism has grown as a counter balance to 
consociationalism. Consociationlism has long been the most dominant paradigm in Political 
Science in regard to multi-ethnic democracies and the managing of large minorities within 
democratic states. The theoretical framework will be further analyzed in later chapters of this 
thesis, particularly when discussing the Good Friday Agreements. The empirical findings of other 
studies, particularly surrounding the educational system and linguistic policies, will be used to 
engage the theoretical framework critically and contribute to a better understanding of the 
Northern Irish case.  
 Since great emphasis will be placed on the educational system in Northern Ireland 
particularly with regard to integrated education, a wide array of academic texts will be taken into 
consideration. An article by Claire McGlynn & al titled Moving out of conflict: the contribution of 
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integrated schools in Northern Ireland (2007) provides a concise review of the academic evidence in 
favor of integrated education. Through the analysis of numerous data sets, the article provides a 
firm argument in favor of integrated education and its potential in promoting the peace and 
reconciliation between the two communities. Similarly, a study conducted by Stringer & al titled 
Intergroup contact, friendship quality and political attitudes (2009) provides further statistical 
evidence in favor of integrated schooling. In a sample of more than 1700 children from a variety of 
educational and ethnic backgrounds, the study found a strong correlation between integrated 
education, long term cross communal friendships and moderate political views (Stringer & al 252, 
253). In the study Conflict, Contact and Education in Northern Ireland (2005) by Niens & Cairns 
Conflict, cross community contact is once again documented to be a positive force for 
reconciliation. This particular text also provides a framework to approach cross-community contact 
through the educational system, by setting up the appropriate structures to ensure its effectiveness. 
Other academic texts (Cassidy & Trew 1998; Tajfel 1982) in the field of social psychology, 
particularly using Social Identity Theory (SIT), provide evidence of shifting identities that can be 
encouraged through integrated education, thus bridging the gap between the traditional Catholic- 
Protestant dichotomies. Other relevant academic research will be presented in the context of 
chapter 2 (McGlynn 2003; Montgomery & al 2003) and will be linked to the overall peace process 
and theoretical framework. In addition to the wide array of academic literature, some non-peer 
reviewed research by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Department of 
Education for Northern Ireland can be of relevance in the discussion surrounding integrated 
education. The report Education Reform in Northern Ireland (2013) provides a clear overview of both 
statistics and opinion polls in addition to the challenges faced by the government in implementing 
education policy. Sources of data provided by government bodies such as the Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency are also particularly relevant when discussing issues of education.  
 In the case of Chapter 3 that focuses on the Irish Language and the prospect of linguistic 
integration in Northern Ireland, much of the literature explored stems from the Official Language 
Acts implemented in both the Republic of Ireland and Scotland. Considering the similarities in 
terms of number of speakers, they provide a good basis to assess the recent linguistic legislation 
proposed by Sinn Fein. An article by Walsh & McLeod on Language legislation and language 
revitalization in Ireland and Scotland (2006) underlines the difficulties in enforcing bilingualism, 
particularly in terms of recruiting bilingual civil servants and acquiring funding. Similarly, a case 
study conducted by Walsh on Irish language policy and language governance (2012) documents a 
series of challenges, particularly in implementing the act. The limited number of Irish language 
speakers in addition to budget limitation have all been identified as major issues in the 
revitalization process imitated by the government (Walsh 339).  In the context of Northern Ireland, 
a study by Chriost on Planning issues for Irish language policy (2010) provides a detailed analysis of 
the data available on the Irish speaking community and proposes a framework for linguistic 
integration based on the Welsh Mentrau Iaith and how this could impact the development of a 
northern Irish identity. Additionally, an article Sarah McMonagle presents an additional 
integrationist argument for the broadening of the linguistic framework in hopes of stimulating a 
shift in group attitudes and identity building. The report on Attitudes towards the Irish language on 
the island of Ireland (2010) by Darmody & Daly provides an overview of surveys and public opinion 
regarding the Irish language on both sides of the border. In terms of non-academic sources, I will 
be extracting data on Irish speakers from both the Irish central statistics office and the Statistics 
agency of Northern Ireland. In addition to that, the study of official publications by Northern Irish 
authorities and institutions can provide an image of the aspirations and limits of linguistic 
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integration. The later part of the chapter will incorporate primary sources from the March 2017 
Stormont Assembly elections in order to reflect on the position of the Irish language in the 
campaign and wider sociopolitical context.   
 
Methodology: 
Despite the qualitative nature of my research and its focus on Northern Ireland and the Good 
Friday Agreement, I will be briefly using case studies and academic research from relevant topics 
and disciplines regardless of geographical location. Case studies such as the impact of Scottish 
Gaelic language policy in Scotland can provide a point of comparison when discussing similar cases 
like the one of the Irish language in Northern Ireland. In order to solidify my arguments, I will be 
using a variety of sources ranging from primary sources such as government publications on 
language and education policy to secondary peer reviewed literature and newspaper articles. 
Political party manifestos, ads and political debates also constitute relevant sources of information 
in this context. My research methods are thus primarily a review of existing literature as well as a 
data analysis of different indices from the sectors of education and language. Additionally, I will be 
using data extracted from official surveys on different issues in order to incorporate public opinion 
into my arguments. Despite my genuine wish to conduct a survey personally in order to extract 
relevant information, the time constraints considerably limit the likelihood of acquiring a 
representative sample that would allow me to construct a robust argument.  Considering the 
academic literature I will be using will not be confined to theoretical literature from the fields of 
political science and international relations, I will be carefully interpreting literature which I can 
comprehend and that is not too technically complex for me to understand. Despite my lack of 
formal training in fields such as social psychology and sociolinguistics, I will only be utilizing 
literature I can clearly understand in order to not misrepresent the views of the authors.  
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Chapter 1: The Good Friday Agreements and theory of power-
sharing 
 
The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was not, by any means, solely the result of 
the recent negotiations; it was the result of a peace process that spanned across almost the entirety 
of the conflict itself. From the collapse of the Sunningdale in agreement 1974 and the signing of the 
Anglo Irish accords in 1984, all the way up to the presidency of Tony Blair and the active 
participation of the Clinton administration, the actors involved were numerous. The resulting text 
that was brought forward in April 1998 encompassed a series of historical lessons and proved to be 
a particularly interesting case study for academics of Peace studies and political science. Its 
unexpected success prompted the surprise of academics and politicians alike, with political 
scientist Donald Horowitz stating Northern Ireland as a particularly “exceptional case” (Horowitz 
197). In the referendum on the implementation of the agreement that took place in May 1998, 81% 
of Northern Irish voters and 95% of voters in the Republic of Ireland had endorsed the agreement 
(ARK 2002). This breakthrough also allowed for constitutional reform in both the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland, with each respective constitution being modified as to encompass the principle 
of consent. The article 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution had long been interpreted by Unionists as a 
breach of British sovereignty since they explicitly mentioned the entire island of Ireland as rightful 
territory of the Republic, pending to be reunified (Irish Constitution 1949).  
The result that was perhaps most notable about the negotiations and subsequent 
agreement was that the political wings of the two largest paramilitary groups, Sinn Fein for the IRA 
and the Ulster Democratic Party for the UDA, had effectively contributed to the creation of a 
workable peace strategy without being excluded from the negotiations. This approach was in direct 
contradiction to the Sunningdale agreements in 1974 that had effectively excluded paramilitary 
groups from the negotiations. Back then, by only including moderate parties from each side like the 
SDLP and the UUP, the more extreme elements effectively brought about the collapse of the 
power-sharing agreement (Horowitz 219). During the GFA negotiations, the parties had opted for 
the inclusion of extreme elements in order to reach a broader consensus. This method was 
pioneered by the Clinton administration and Senator George Mitchell in particular, who was tasked 
with mediating the negotiations (BBC 1998). The most crucial part of the negotiation came in the 
form of a great concession by the Sinn Fein leadership, which up until that point was reluctant to 
accept any proposal that did not include a United Ireland (The Guardian 1998). In a political 
“sleight of hand”, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness had effectively reversed party policy to 
accommodate the new reality of the upcoming agreement. The agreement was itself based on the 
idea of majority consent, which effectively paved the only road to Irish reunification in the form of 
a referendum and thus by the endorsement of the majority of the people in Northern Ireland (Good 
Friday Agreement 1998).  
 The theoretical interpretation of the agreement is far from straightforward and has been 
the subject of heated debate. Nevertheless, its basic structure, as I will argue, bears some 
resemblance to the model presented by mainstream consociational theory. The two competing 
theories, namely consociationalism and integrationistm, hold very different approaches in regard to 
solving ethno-religious conflicts like the one in Northern Ireland. Consociationalist power sharing 
is based on a more pessimistic view of divided societies, in which a well-established power sharing 
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system that minimizes contact between the two communities and maintains relative peace in a 
social structure of competing identities (McGarry & O’Leary 254). Northern Ireland is treated as a 
bi-national state in which the two conflicting identities are both salient and resistant to change 
(Hughes 3). The basic framework provided by consociationlists as the “guide book” for power 
sharing in plural societies boils down to 4 main elements (McGarry & O’Leary 44; Dixon 359; 
Horowitz 194): 
(a) Power Sharing Executive: Ensures that executive power at all levels is shared proportionally 
between the main communities. 
(b)  Autonomy: Ensures that each community maintains a set level of autonomy that can 
include territorial autonomy (in the case of federations) or cultural autonomy through 
separate social institutions.   
(c) Grand coalition: Ensures a consensus among the largest political actors in order to ensure 
support for power sharing across communities. 
(d) Mutual veto: Ensures that each community can protect its vital interests in the political 
arena. 
The consotitational theoretical prescription of “Autonomy” will be the one of the main theoretical 
arguments which will receive further scrutiny in the following chapters; the notion of cultural 
autonomy is entrenched in consotiational theory and includes both linguistic and educational 
segregation. An additional aspect of the theory which will also provide a basis for discussion is the 
assumption that identities, especially in regions with antagonistic ethnic conflicts, are monolithic 
and inherently divisive. In consotiational terms, segregated power-sharing is the endgame of ethnic 
conflict, in that it perpetually suppresses antagonistic forces that endanger peace by allowing for 
relative autonomy and minimization of contact.  
 When discussing integrationism in the case of Northern Ireland, it is important to 
acknowledge that a series of different approaches exist. Considering that integrationism is 
predicated on the assumptions that identities are fluid and subject to change, the framework and 
circumstances under which this change can occur is subject to question (Rupert 37). Three distinct 
forms of integrationism can be identified in the case of Northern Ireland (McGarry & O’Leary 250, 
251):  
(1) Irish inegrationism: Republicans that reject the Agreement in hopes of diluting and integrating 
the Unionist identity in the Irish Nation State.  
(2) British integrationism: Unionists that reject the Agreement as they firmly believe that the 
Catholic identity can be accommodated in the British nation-state without the need for power 
sharing institutions.  
(3) Power-sharing integrationism: The concept of integrating both the British and Irish identity 
under Northern Ireland with the creation of a distinct but inclusive Northern Irish identity. 
In the context of this thesis, the form of integrationism that I will be mostly referring to is that of 
power-sharing. Nevertheless, I will occasionally mention the Irish variant of integrationism as often 
referred to by Sinn Fein politicians. As advocated by numerous scholars, the power-sharing variant 
of integrationism presented for the case of Northern Ireland, is aimed at the creation of a cross-
communal form of civil nationalism aimed at tuning down rival ethno-religious identities that are 
perceived as the root of the conflict (Taylor 47). In this specific context, power-sharing is seen as a 
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means for achieving further social integration and permanently erasing the root of the conflict. 
Integrationionalists seek to exploit the stability offered by power-sharing in order to encourage 
cross community contact and bring about a more homogenous identity and integrated society 
(Dixon 365; Taylor 48). This theoretical framework also entails overtly different policy prescriptions 
when it comes to cultural autonomy, education and language. The gradual implementation of an 
integrated educational system for all Northern Irish citizens has long been advocated by 
integrationists. The Alliance party, the largest bi-communal party, clearly states that integrated 
education is a “key part” of its policy proposals (Alliance 2017). Integrationist scholars also tend to 
advocate for the replacement of Proportional representation (STV) in favor of Alternative Vote 
(AV) which involves preferential voting to ensure majority support in single member districts 
(McGarry & O’Leary 253; Horowitz 196). This is done in hopes of encouraging politicians to reach 
outside their communal group for votes in addition to keeping small hard-line parties out of the 
executive by raising the threshold. Unlike Consociationalism, the institutional proposals of 
integrationist theory remain rather vague; these mostly amount to the willingness of integrating 
social, political and cultural life in hopes of creating a common identity as a way to achieve durable 
peace. 
 Due to the ambiguity of integrationism when it comes to preferred institutions, the 
interpretation of the agreement has been diverse and contradictory among scholars. Overall, the 
agreement bears great resemblance to the institutional requirements set by consociationalists: the 
executive is elected with a system of Proportional Representation (STV) and is organized in a bi-
communal fashion, with Members of the assembly registering their respective allegiance (either 
Nationalist, Unionist or other)(Good Friday Agreement 1998). In addition to the notion of 
proportionality, the agreement’s system of parallel consent for key decisions could be logically 
interpreted as a veto system. On Strand One article 5 of the Good Friday Agreement, it is stated 
that for key decisions, legislation needs to be passed with either weighted majority or parallel 
consent (Good Friday Agreement 1998). Weighted majority imposes a 60% majority vote in 
addition to at least 40% positive votes from each community. Parallel consent ensures an overall 
majority (50%) in addition to a majority in each community. This ensures that each community can 
simply block decisions if these prove to be too polarizing or disadvantageous. When it comes to the 
argument of Grand Coalition, interpretation is more ambiguous. Although all major parties that are 
represented in Stormont take part in the executive and comply with the principles of the GFA, 
there has been a history of non-compliance and boycott by the DUP, a major unionist party. 
Finally, the lack of clear measures regarding cultural, educational or linguistic autonomy form a 
divergence in terms of interpretation; the agreement does not explicitly mention what steps should 
be taken in terms of educational or linguistic policy. On strand three, under the chapter on 
Economic, cultural and social issues, the government of the United Kingdom pledges to “take 
resolute action to promote the Irish language” and “seek to remove barriers that could work against 
the maintenance of the language” (Good Friday Agreement 1998). In clause 15 of the St Andrews 
Agreement, there was a further pledge by the British government to “enhance and protect” the Irish 
language (St Andrews Agreement 2006). Despite the guarantees for promotion of the Irish 
language, there is a lack of descriptive institutional proposals as to how this should be achieved. 
Sinn Fein has long interpreted these as an amendment for fully fledged linguistic integration in 
Northern Ireland, with Irish having equal status to that of English and allow it to be used in courts, 
parliament and the civil service. Under the current system, the promotion of the Irish language is 
done by a series of autonomous or government funded organizations, largely controlled by the 
catholic community. In that regard, the catholic community retains relative autonomy over the 
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promotion and the teaching of the Irish language in schools. In terms of educational reform, the 
agreement does not explicitly mention anything other than a vague statement for “the promotion 
of integrated education” (Good Friday Agreement 1998). This has allowed for the maintaining of a 
segregated educational system, in which each community remains firmly in control of its respective 
schools: 87% of Catholics and 79% of Protestant pupils attend their respective sectarian schools 
(Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education 2013). The absence of institutions dictating 
educational and linguistic structures has led to a segregated system resembling those advocated by 
consotiationalists. Nevertheless, this relative ambiguity also leaves room for a more nuanced 
theoretical approach, particularly when it comes to education and language. Interpreting the 
agreements along more integrationist lines when it comes to education is, as I will argue, a 
constructive way of consolidating peace. In the following chapter, I will be endeavoring into an 
analysis of the integrated schooling system and how the compiled academic evidence reinforces the 
integrationist argument regarding education and identity. 
 
Chapter 2: Integrated education in Northern Ireland: a tool for 
consolidating peace? 
 
 Prior to the establishment of integrated education, schooling only operated in in a 
segregated fashion: despite the willingness of Unionist Protestants to create a single educational 
system after the establishment of Northern Ireland, fierce opposition from the Catholic Church and 
Irish republicans led to a divided system. It was instead decided that three types of schools would 
be allowed: controlled, maintained and voluntary (CAIN History of Education). Each type of school 
was more or less government controlled, with funding fluctuating accordingly; Voluntary Catholic 
schools were initially deprived of crucial funding since the Catholic Church had boycotted the Lynn 
committee tasked with setting up the educational system (CAIN History of Education). The 
subsequent reforms, particularly the 1947 Education act, allowed for Catholic schools to be 
maintained and managed by a body of designated members of the catholic community, providing 
relative autonomy (Northern Ireland education act 1947) 
 Integrated schooling has been part of the Northern Irish educational system since 1978, 
when a motion passed was by the British government in order to “facilitate the creation of 
Northern Irish schools likely to be attended by pupils of different religious and cultural 
backgrounds” (Northern Ireland education act 1978). This reform provided a framework for joint 
cross-communal management of schools and a curriculum encompassing broader Christian values 
and more common patterns of history and culture (Northern Ireland education act 1978). Despite 
the presence of the legal framework, most churches opted out of establishing integrated schools, 
with the first being inaugurated only in 1981. Later legal refinements allowed for already established 
catholic maintained or Controlled schools to obtain integrated status, particularly after the 1989 
education act (Controlled schools adhere directly to the educational authority and are attended 
almost exclusively by protestants pupils. In 2016 only 4.3% of Controlled secondary school pupils 
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were registered Catholics).  In 1987, the Northern Ireland council for Integrated Education was 
established in hope of coordinating the newly founded integrated schools and promoting the 
creation of new schools. Nevertheless, the level of integrated education has remained limited ever 
since, with around 90% of pupils being educated separately. The school system in Northern Ireland 
is, due to the sectarian division, composed of many distinct types of schools that are managed by 
different actors (Department of Education 2017): 
(a) Controlled schools: As mentioned previously, controlled schools are primarily 
attended to by Protestant pupils and managed by the board of Governors that operates 
under the Education Authority (EA). The Controlled School’s support Council (CSSC) 
is a non-statutory organ tasked with supporting and representing controlled schools. 
(b) Maintained schools: Are led by a school board of Governors accountable to the Council 
for Catholic Maintained Schools (CCMS). The CCMS effectively leads and coordinates 
maintained schools but is funded by the Department of Education. 
(c) Voluntary grammar schools: These include schools that operate independently and are 
accountable to their Board of Governors. The percentage of government funding is 
determined by the management structures of the school. 
(d) Integrated schools: operate in a bi-communal fashion and has a Board of Governors 
composed of parent representatives, teachers and Department of Education staff. 
Controlled schools can earn integrated status if a certain sectarian ratio of pupils and 
board members is respected. Integrated schools can differ depending on the 
administration. 
(e) Irish medium schools: provide education in the Irish language and are funded by the 
Department of Education. 
The sheer complexity of the current system is, to a certain extent, a legacy of the deep societal 
divisions. The overtime statistical trends offers an interesting overview regarding the level of 
segregation in education. From 2005 to 2016, the percentage of students enrolled in integrated 
primary and post primary schools has increased by only 1.57 %, from 5.47% in to 7.04% (See 
figure 2). Despite the apparent divisions, the experiment of integrated education in Northern 
Ireland has been the subject of intensive research. A parallel understanding of Northern Irish 
public opinion through opinion polls and existing research on integrated education provides a 
strong argument for integrationism; increasing the number of pupils in integrated schools is 
both feasible due to growing popular support but also empirically proven to benefit the peace 
process. Within the framework of the Good Friday Agreement, education can be reformed 
along integrationist lines and have a lasting impact.   
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Figure 2: 
 
 
 
 
 The argument for integrated education presupposes the validity of the integrationist 
assumption regarding the fluidity of social identity. If social identity cannot be shifted through 
education and contact with the “rival” group, there would be little motivation to challenge the 
status quo. This point of view is often expressed by consociationalists who argue that identities in 
deeply divided societies are monolithic and that, in case further integeration, these identities are 
more likely to clash than they are to accommodate difference (Hughes 3). This alternative is often 
presented as one that is more realistic to the one offered by integrationists. The question of identity 
is one that has been thoroughly debated in the case of Northern Ireland, particularly with the 
addition of identity related questions in the 2011 population census. According to the census, 29.44 
percent of the total population identifies as “Northern Irish”; at first glance, this suggests the 
emergence of a new post conflict identity (Census Northern Ireland 2011). Nevertheless, the limited 
amount of data extracted regarding identity prior to the 2011 census does not leave room for much 
interpretation. Two more surveys that were undertaken in 2003 and 2004 showed that around 23% 
of the population identified as Northern Irish (NILT 2003-2004). Nonetheless, the lack of clear 
overtime trend makes it difficult to draw conclusions: the meaning of a “Northern Irish” identity is 
ambiguous. A study published by Todd in 2006 that presented a series of questionnaires and 
interviews on questions of identity further underlines this feeling of ambiguity; the respondents 
often referred to “northern Ireland” without a capital “N”, which would suggest that they identify 
simply as Irish from the North (Todd 15). Additionally, a series of interviews conducted in the 
context of the research showed that the term “Northern Irish” was being used a “politically safe” 
term (Todd 18). Although an identity shift in broader society has been hard to pin down, the 
educational context provides some more conclusive evidence regarding more accommodative 
identities and attitudes particularly through integrated education. 
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 A crucial point lies in understanding the causal relation between negative intergroup 
attitudes and institutions: Integrationists claim that the perpetual institutional segregation is 
accentuating division (Dixon 336) while consociationalists claim that these attitudes are merely the 
result of the conflict and that institutions are necessary to avoid large scale violence (McGarry & 
O’Leary 276). The educational system and particularly the experiment of integrated education in 
Northern Ireland provides an observable microcosm of this theoretical clash. I will now proceed by 
reviewing a wide array of academic research and data exploring the link between social identity, 
inter-communal attitude and education in Northern Ireland.  
  
 Early research from the 70s initially established a link between educational segregation and 
mutual distrust. In the four districts analyzed, teachers expressed grave concern regarding the 
absence of inter-communal cooperation in schooling and the potential perpetuation of hostile 
communal attitudes (Darby & all 1977). The major polls done among past pupils of integrated 
schools provide a clear image of the impact of inter-group contact on social attitudes. Despite 
considering family influences as more important in terms of identity, most of the students who had 
not experienced contact with the other community prior to integrated education were consistently 
ranked among the most influenced and enlightened by the experience of integrated education 
(McGlynn 153). 93% of the students surveyed stated that integrated education had a positive impact 
on their lives through generating respect for diversity and security when around members of the 
other community (McGlynn 153). Another strong indicator lies in the percentage of students able to 
hold mixed friendships, which went from 41 % prior to integrated education to 67%: in a context of 
segregated housing, the maintenance of such friendships is a considerable challenge (McGlynn 153). 
This tendency of cross-communal long–term friendships was also reflected in the choice of partner, 
with more than 50% of surveyed integrated school students having a partner of different 
background. The constraining role that the wider community plays in terms of cross-group contact 
cannot be understated. As the previous study suggests, the school platform could work as a 
substitute to encourage stable cross-communal links. Many of these findings were replicated in a 
later study that, once again found a correlation between integrated education and long term cross-
communal friendships (Stringer & al 252). An additional observation was made in terms of the 
moderation of political views for integrated school attendees; greater moderation in terms of 
political convictions can go a long way in establishing a more stable peace. In addition to that, a 
2007 study by Hayes & al established a correlation between integrated school attendance and 
Northern Irish identity. In a sample of integrated school attendees, 24.1 % of Protestants and 29.5% 
of Catholics were identifying as Northern Irish, compared to only 15% and 24% for individuals that 
attended segregated schools (Hayes 470). Political affiliation was also more moderate for integrated 
school attendees with 43.2% of Protestants and 41.5% of Catholics not registering as either Unionist 
or Nationalist compared to 30.6% and 32.6% for their non-integrated schooled counterparts (Hayes 
470). Although the fluctuations are relatively limited, the existence of a correlation between 
integrated schooling and relative political moderation in two sets of data could be reflective of a 
more tolerant group.  
 
 In parallel to the increasingly overwhelming evidence of a causal link between integrated 
schooling, moderate attitudes and cross-communal links, public opinion in Northern Ireland has 
been consistently voicing its support for integrated education.  According to a series of surveys, the 
majority of Northern Irish citizens strongly support more mixed schooling; two polls done in 1999 
and 2003 by the NILT found that a large majority of interviewees (74% and 73% for each year 
respectively) were for the promotion of integrated education (NILT 1999-2003). Similarly, in a 2013 
poll, more than 55% of respondents expressed agreement to the statement “The Northern Ireland 
executive should set a date for the complete desegregation of our school system” (IEF 2013). Even 
when the respondents were asked if they agreed with the statement “Northern Ireland’s segregated 
educational system perpetuates division in our society” the percentage of agreement was of 63%.  
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The average number of pupils per class is also reflective of the demand and need for more 
integrated schooling; grand maintained integrated schools hold the highest number of average 
pupils at 27 per classroom, 2 pupils over the national average of 25 (Department of Education 
Statistical Bulletin 2017).  
 
 Nonetheless, this apparent willingness for integrated education has not led to any 
significant increase in numbers of integrated school attendees (See figure 2). Despite the academic 
evidence pointing decisively towards the importance of children being educated in a bi-sectarian 
environment, severe political disagreements has been standing in the way of a flourishing 
integrated school system. The recent political material published for the March 2017 Assembly 
election provides an overview of the issues obstructing more effective schooling integration. As 
previously mentioned, the integrated schooling sector is diverse and does not adhere to a set 
framework. The only requirements set are for an approximately equal number of enrolments from 
Protestant and Catholic pupils and a board of Governors reflective of the ethnic ratio (NICIE 
Integrated Education). Consequently, there can be severe discrepancies in terms of modes of 
operation and curricula; some school tend to operate in more secular fashion while others choose 
to highlight religious elements, predominantly of the Christian faith (NICIE Integrated Education). 
Although all schools must adhere to the statutory curriculum, relative flexibility remains, with the 
ability for schools to teach Irish optionally or underline particular traditions of their choice. The 
2016 Shared education act did push for further mixing of schools and reflected an overall political 
willingness for integration. Despite that fact, the bill remained very vague, reflecting an apparent 
difficulty for political parties to agree on a common set of policies. Although most political parties 
consent to the principle of integrating the educational system, many disagree on how this should 
be achieved. The bill did not go deeper than a mere encouragement of mixed education as a whole 
and a slight increase in the funds allocated (Shared Education Act 2016). This ideological rift is 
apparent in the Sinn Fein policy proposals, who has been calling for an “Irish style” educational 
system. The official party policy on integrated education has been to endorse multi-denominational 
schools all while pushing for a change in the school curriculum with hopes of integrating Northern 
Ireland into an all-Ireland school system (Sinn Fein 2017). Unsurprisingly, Sinn Fein’s official line is 
to gradually integrate to the Republic of Ireland’s school system; party policy adheres to the notion 
of Irish Integrationism that was discussed in chapter 2. There has been a deliberate push for the 
teaching of Irish history and the “promotion of our common Irishness”. Sinn Fein’s main objection 
stems from the common held conviction that the educational system, in its current form, is 
unnaturally enforcing a sense of “Britishness” onto Northern Ireland’s youth (Sinn Fein 2017). Other 
main parties such as the DUP, SDLP and Alliance do not approach integrated education with such 
skepticism; none of the above mentioned parties campaigned for the change in school curriculum 
and all are in favor of integrated education (Democratic Unionist Party 2017; Social Democratic and 
Labor Party 2017; Alliance Party 2017). Such a split along ideological lines can indeed be an 
impediment to educational integration. Nevertheless, regardless of curriculum reform, the 
willingness of parties and citizens to have Northern Irish youth be educated in a more integrated 
fashion needs to be exploited. As the previously mentioned research demonstrates, the impact of 
bi-communal schooling on attitudes, political views and even identity should not be 
underestimated.  
 
 The findings regarding the impact of integrated schooling in Northern Ireland seem to 
contradict, at least partly, the consociational assumption of perpetually clashing and mutually 
unaccommodating identities. The research conducted in the field of social psychology, particularly 
regarding the impact of integrated schooling on Northern Irish pupils, should be taken into 
account by political scientists when discussing prospects of social integration. It is undoubtedly 
true that segregation and polarization persist and that the level of integration achievable in the 
near future needs to remain realistic: according to the 2011 census, about 90% of social housing 
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estates still hold at least 80% of one communal group (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research 
Agency 2011). It is nevertheless important to accommodate integrationist principles regarding the 
possibility for identities to be shaped through cross-communal contact and education. The growing 
popular support for mixed education in addition to a considerable portion of the public voicing its 
conviction that segregated education vitiates and divides Northern Irish society is somewhat 
contradictory to consotiational theory. Under these assumption, any cross-communal contact is 
more likely to create conflict than it is to create moderation and, with experimental evidence 
mounting, it is perhaps time for consotiationalists to rethink their assumptions on culture and 
identity. In the context of Northern Ireland, the importance placed on cultural autonomy and thus 
communal control over integrated education has been considerably overstated. Although a 
complete integration of the educational system is implausible due to ideological divides between 
the major parties, the promotion of integrated schooling within the current legal and institutional 
framework is more than likely to constructively contribute to the peace process. Despite the 
inconclusive evidence surrounding the possibility of an integrated school system contributing to 
the creation of a post-conflict Northern Irish identity, a shift towards more inclusive attitudes is 
likely to occur, particularly through the maintenance of cross-communal friendships. The 
endorsement of integrated education in the Good Friday Agreement can, despite its vague nature, 
be a basis for further integration. Under article 1 of the Good Friday Agreement’s Anglo-Irish treaty, 
the right of each citizen to identify as they choose, to hold both Irish and British citizenship and 
live on either side of the border is constitutionally guaranteed (Good Friday Agreement 1998). The 
emergence of a mixed Northern Irish identity is therefore constitutionally protected from political 
encroachment, regardless of its likelihood of development. Overall, it is hard to deny that the 
consociational principles of proportionality and mutual veto have been both crucial in the case of 
Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, under the relative stability provided by the power sharing 
agreement it is important to acknowledge the potential for solidifying peace is present in the 
initiative of integrated education. The continued emphasis by consociationalists on cultural 
autonomy as a means of avoiding inter-communal tensions needs to be further nuanced. As I have 
clearly demonstrated, integrated education is, in the case of Northern Ireland, a key factor in 
establishing long term peace and a strong argument in favor of integrationism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAGE 22 
Chapter 3: Irish language Policy, identity and the limits social 
integration: 
 
 The relative achievability and effectiveness of educational integration primarily stems from 
the fact that it is relatively uncontroversial, as seen in the previous figures. In contrast to integrated 
education that generally enjoys widespread support, the further integration of the Irish language in 
the Northern Irish state is particularly polarizing and vitiating to political discourse. Any discussion 
regarding reform or refinement of the Good Friday Agreement along integrationist lines ought to 
address the issue of linguistic policy and the Irish Language. As I will argue in this last chapter, the 
Irish language presents a crucial challenge to the integrationist framework that has often not been 
properly addressed. The argument put forward by some academics claiming that the Irish language 
is increasingly transcending religious boundaries and integrating into greater society (Malcolm 
2009; Chriost 122) has been mildly inaccurate, particularly following the 2011 Census data. In order 
build a stable peace process and encourage social integration, academics and policy makers alike 
need to acknowledge challenges and shortcoming in order to remain realistic about what can be 
achieved. As I will attempt demonstrate, the political and social friction created around the Irish 
language in Northern Ireland clearly underlines the limits of integrationist theory and remains a 
major political issue that is best addressed by a more institutionally nuanced approach.  
 
 A brief look at the history of the Irish Language provides some important tools to 
understand recent developments and why the language has been so inherently linked to the Irish 
identity. Despite Irish remaining a majority language on the island up until the early 1800, a series 
of policies instituted by the British authorities such as the banning of Irish language classes at 
schools had considerably reduced the overall number of speakers. The Great Famine that took 
place in the 19th century disproportionally affected Irish native speakers, essentially causing the 
endangerment of the Irish language (Falc’Her-Poyroux 12). Additionally, the subsequent waves of 
emigration further decreased the number of speakers; official 1851 figures show a net 1.5 million 
Irish speakers having emigrated in the past 10 years (Falc’Her-Poyroux 2). With the rise of Irish 
Nationalism and with the survival of the language in jeopardy, the movement known as the Gaelic 
Revival spread through the Irish intellectual elite and gained traction in the general population. 
Ever since, the Irish language has become a highly emotionalized symbol of Irish nationalism; the 
lack of native speakers meant that there was little practical use in adopting the language and thus 
the revival of the language was primarily founded on a nationalist agenda. This made the Irish 
language a deeply politicized issue which directly impacted its development and historic position 
in the Northern Irish state. Ever since the establishment of Northern Ireland, Irish was perceived as 
a symbol of Irish separatism and thus a threat to British Unionism; as mentioned during the 
chapter on education, public funding for Catholic schools teaching Irish was practically ceased. The 
historical developments during the Troubles further added to the historical tensions, with many of 
the interned Republican paramilitaries learning Irish during their time in prison as a symbol of 
dedication to the cause (BBC 2014). Among them was Republican leader Gerry Adams who still 
holds great power in the Irish political scene. The major breakthrough in the recognition of Irish as 
a minority language and the allocation of funds to its preservation came under the Good Friday 
Agreement which provided legal backing to the long held demands of nationalists. Although the 
Agreement did not provide concrete policy proposals regarding the integration of the Irish 
language in the State, it did pledge for the promotion of the language (Good Friday Agreement 
1998). Some of the more concrete policy proposals included: the facilitation of Irish medium 
education, providing autonomy and recognition to the Irish Language community by ensuring their 
representation in the public authorities and the availability of Teilifis na Gaeilige (an Irish language 
TV channel operating in the Republic) (Good Friday Agreement 1998). Nevertheless, the 
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institutional framework was quite vague and, upon being revisited in 2006 under the St Andrews 
Agreement, remained a major source of resentment; many senior Republicans still argue that the 
Good Friday and St Andrews Agreement guaranteed the establishment of Irish as an official 
language. On the other hand, Unionists interpreted the current constitutional pledge as a mere 
promotion of the language at the local government level (Belfast Telegraph 2017). Unlike for the 
case of education, the cultural autonomy granted to the local Irish language communities has been 
a positive force in the peace process by alleviating tension. As the evidence suggests, pushing for a 
full integration of Irish is unlikely to yield a considerable change in the number of speakers or 
indeed lead to a shift in Protestant perceptions and identity. Incorporating findings from other 
Official language acts in Wales, Scotland and the Republic of Ireland is essential in exploring all the 
overlapping dimension and repercussion of such a political decision.  
 
 
 Just like in the case of education, two different variants of integration are brought forward: 
the interpretation brought forward by Sinn Fein is once again reflective of its nationalist 
integrationist tendencies. In its official manifesto, Sinn Fein clearly states its willingness to create a 
bilingual society on the whole of the island of Ireland (Sinn Fein 2017). Nonsectarian parties like 
Alliance, although partly supporting the Irish language act, do it for very different reasons; as 
power sharing integrationists, they express their support in hopes of expanding the social platform 
and “promoting common cultural heritage” (Alliance 2017). By stressing the need to include every 
member of the community, there has been a considerable attempt to de-politicize the issue in 
hopes of creating a wider and more inclusive Northern Irish identity (Alliance 2017). This view is 
held by some of integrationist scholars that see the further integration of the Irish language as an 
opportunity for more Catholics to identify with the state and thus form a stronger and more 
inclusive identity (Chriost 311; Chriost 122; Woods 1998; Malcolm 2009). Nevertheless, these 
assumptions can hardly withstand empirical scrutiny, particularly after the 2011 census and the 
apparent shrinking of Irish speakers. Any large scale language act needs to gather considerable 
popular support and convince Northern Irish citizens, particularly Protestants, that such a 
decisions is useful and worth the expenditure. The DUP’s position on the Irish language act prior to 
the March 2017 elections is reflective of this; Arlene Foster, leader of the DUP, stated that a Polish 
language act would make more sense since more people in Northern Ireland speak Polish (Belfast 
Telegraph 2017). Regardless of future legislation, it is likely that even if such an act is implemented, 
there would be a major backlash from the Protestant community, a turn of events that would be 
detrimental to the peace process.  
 
 The trend in terms of the number of Irish language speakers in Northern Ireland has been 
steadily decreasing throughout the past 30 years; the percentage of citizens able to speak, write, 
read and understand Irish has dwindled. The percentage went from 5.26% of the total population in 
1991 down to 3.7% in 2011 (See figure 3). Even when including individuals with partial knowledge of 
the Irish Language, the figures remain very low: the percentage of citizens with no knowledge of 
the Irish language has actually increased overtime, going from 87.9% in 1991 to 89% in 2011 
(Northern Ireland Census 1991; Northern Ireland Census 2011). These figures are also reflected in 
the general population: a 2013 Irish language survey provides an overview of the attitudes towards 
the Irish Language in both the North and the South. Indices such as the willingness of students and 
parents to have Irish taught at school is reflective of the major differences that persist. In the 
Republic of Ireland, more than 50% of both parents and students wish to have Irish taught at 
school as opposed to around 17% in Northern Ireland (Darmody 74). What is perhaps worth noting 
is that more that almost 60% of students in the North and 40% of parents actively object to the 
teaching of Irish in schools, a figure that is down to 30% and 5% respectively in the Republic 
(Darmody 74). Similarly, in a part of the survey dedicated to the impact of government action on 
the Irish language, opinions are reflective of the overall skepticism of such an act in Northern 
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Ireland; only 32% of the total sample of the respondents deemed the offering of public services in 
Irish as important. The evidence gathered from the Irish language act and the Gaelic language act 
in Scotland present a series of challenges that would be difficult to overcome, particularly in the 
context of Northern Ireland. The Irish language act as currently proposed by Sinn Fein underlines 
the importance of the State providing a certain number of public services in Irish (Sinn Fein 2017). 
In both the Republic of Ireland and Scotland, this aspect was particularly problematic, especially 
when it came to recruiting bilingual staff (Walsh & McLeod 42). Research done specifically 
regarding the quality of public service provision in Galway reflected a strong criticism by Native 
Irish speakers in terms of the quality and standard of Irish of most civil servants (Walsh & McLeod 
32). Even when it comes to language literacy levels, native Irish speakers from the Gaeltacht areas 
(the main Irish speaking regions in the Republic) tend to be more literate and skilled in the English 
language, often opting for English state documentation (Walsh & McLeod 32).  The dubious quality 
of translations provided have also acted as an impediment to the use of the Irish language in state 
affairs. Another major obstacle to language integration at the level of the state is mainly rooted in 
the political problems created when imposing Irish language requirements to a large number of 
public sector positions. In the case of Wales, the barriers to employment created by the addition of 
Welsh language requirements have been a driver of anti-language policy resentment, particularly in 
areas with high unemployment (Walsh McLeod 33). The complexity of language policy and the 
challenges that arise when attempting to revitalize and integrate minority or endangered languages 
is clearly reflected in the literature. The ethno-political and historical tensions in Northern Ireland 
act, in this case, as a problem multiplier. The arguments presented by integrationists in terms of 
language policy appear non-realistic when taking into consideration the recent political 
developments. Some academics have stated that the current obstacle to further integration of the 
Irish language boils down “incomplete understanding” of the other group caused by consociational 
divide that accentuates segregation and obstructs a more flexible linguistic framework (McMongale 
267). Such an analysis through the integrationist lens grossly underestimates the historic 
background and the level of divisiveness that has been centered on the Irish language. The 
complexity of the task at hand further adds to the challenges; similar initiatives throughout the 
United Kingdom have been costly both in economic and political terms, even without the political 
polarization present in Northern Ireland. Although linguistic diversity should be undoubtedly 
guaranteed, a major departure from the current framework, as laid in the Good Friday Agreement 
and the subsequent institutional foundations, would be potentially harmful to the peace process. 
The consociational principles of cultural autonomy has been, in this case, sufficient in both 
appeasing nationalist discontent regarding the language within the state but also ensure that the 
Irish language does not appear as a threat to Protestants. The existence of intergovernmental 
bodies such as the Foras na Gaeilge that actively promotes the Irish language in addition to the 
ability for students to attend Irish education provides a satisfactory level of linguistic integration. 
The recent electoral campaign for the March 2017 assembly elections highlights the issues and 
limitations of integration for the Irish language. It is crucial for academics to take into 
consideration political developments. In the case of Northern Ireland, political developments in the 
context of the March election present a sobering reminder of the limits of social integration. 
Despite its usefulness and theoretical relevance, it is important to acknowledge the limitations and 
empirical weaknesses of the framework.  
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Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 The evidence of political polarization surrounding the question of the Irish language in the 
current political stage is omnipresent. As of June 2017, Sinn Fein has effectively ruled out entering 
in an executive coalition without the presence of an Irish language act. On the opposing side, the 
DUP has effectively refused to accept the Irish language act in its current form. It has instead 
advocated for the inclusion of Ulster Scots in the act, a Germanic dialect spoken by the Scottish 
settlers that first moved to the province of Ulster (The Guardian 2017). A debate that took place in 
2015 regarding the Irish language bill as proposed by Sinn Fein led to a heated exchange regarding 
Sinn Fein’s position regarding Irish in the public sector. Declan Kearneyone of Sinn Fein publicly 
defended one of the drafts presented by his party which wanted Irish speakers in Northern Ireland 
to be prioritized in civil service positions through an affirmative action plan (BBC 2015). The 
response by the DUP’s Nelson McCausland as well as some audience members was highly critical 
and made reference to the minute number of fluent speakers and the financial strain that would be 
put on the Northern Irish state (BBC 2015). In December 2016, a political row between the 
governing parties led to a brief withdrawal of funding by the DUP of an Irish language scheme 
aimed at promoting the language (BBC 2016). The DUP has repeatedly accused Sinn Fein of abusing 
the Irish language as a cultural tool to pursue political ends (BBC 2016). Similarly, Sinn Fein’s 
Martin McGuinness accused the DUP, prior to his death in March 2017, of expressing blatant hatred 
towards Irish speakers (BBC 2016). Overall, the electoral campaign that took place in March 2017 
greatly reflects the deep divisions that persist. The rhetoric surrounding the integration of the Irish 
language at the state level remains divisive and polarized and thus not a likely candidate for further 
social integration. The elements that obstruct the Irish language from achieving the same status as 
English are not just limited to the historical position of Irish as an emblem of Nationalism and the 
Republican movement. In the Republic of Ireland, the process of revitalizing and integrating the 
language was a particularly difficult and costly procedure; it is understandably challenging for 
unionist politicians to allow such a large public expenditure in an era of spending cuts. With the 
number of fluent Irish speakers at less than 3.7%, convincing the general public that such a 
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language act is purely practical and not motivated by Irish nationalism is an arduous task. Though 
well-intentioned, the argument presented by integrationists regarding the inclusion of the Irish 
language in the political arena rings hollow when taking into account historical and recent political 
developments. With the number of speakers still in downward trend, there is no empirical evidence 
suggesting that a language act is likely to affect the number of speakers unless the teaching of Irish 
becomes a mandatory part of the school system, which is nearly impossible. The decision of Arlene 
Foster of the DUP to thank the principal of a Grammar school in Irish is undoubtedly a source of 
hope for the future (BBC 2017). Nevertheless, this move should be welcomed for what it is, a pre-
electoral reconciliatory move: the Irish language remains a divisive issue. Academics should remain 
realistic about what can be achieved in the context of a deeply divided society with conflicting 
identities: incorporating Irish at this current time is simply unlikely to initiate any substantial shift 
towards a more inclusive identity. The institutions provided by the Good Friday Agreement should 
be utilized to the fullest extent by ensuring that Irish speakers are represented at the government 
level and that funds are allocated for the promotion and preservation of their language. The 
principles of autonomy for cultural affairs in the case of the Irish language as presented by 
consociationlists is perhaps a better solution for the near future in ensuring the stability of the 
power-sharing agreement.   
 
 
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
 The peace process in Northern Ireland has been a long uphill struggle in a battleground of 
opposed identities and paramilitary violence. The peace agreement devised and implemented in 
1998 was both unexpected and encouraging for academics and citizens alike. 19 years after the 
Omagh bombing that claimed the lives of 29 civilians, the Good Friday Agreement is still holding, 
despite having to overcome numerous challenges and threats to its existence. Its relative success 
has attracted the attention of numerous academics of different backgrounds that have used it as a 
case study for maintaining relative peace and democracy in multi-ethnic and multi-religious states. 
Both Consociationalists and Integrationists have attempted to interpret the agreement and refine 
each theoretical approach in order to better understand the managing of conflicts in multi-ethnic 
states. The case of Northern Ireland underlines the importance of incorporating empirical evidence 
in the conduct of policy and realm of academia. As I attempted to demonstrate, the theories 
employed by political scientists in order to explain the peace process and power-sharing often fall 
short of expectations when it comes to grasping the complexity of the object of study. It is of crucial 
importance to perpetually refine our theoretical understandings and remain open to new empirical 
evidence. In the case of Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement, the theoretical approach 
to peace is far from straightforward; the evidence gathered throughout the peace process is vast 
and ought to be taken into consideration. Integrated education is a strong argument in favor of 
integrationism: the experiment that started in the early 80s has clearly been documented to deliver 
positive results in terms of mutual perception and more accommodating identities. The 
consociational assumption that the two communities would cling own to their educational 
autonomy and maintain their wish to be educated separately has been shattered as public opinion 
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following the Good Friday Agreement has shifted. Likewise, the image of the perpetually clashing 
monolithic identities have been somewhat inaccurate; despite the lack of decisive evidence on the 
development of a Northern Irish identity, integrated education clearly affects the way students 
choose to identify or relate to other students. Although it would be unreasonable to expect a full 
educational integration in the near future, the very act of educating students in a bi-sectarian 
fashion has the possibility to transform Northern Irish society and solidify peace. The increased 
contact between the two communities has, in this case, not led to any considerable friction or clash 
unlike what some consociationalists predicted. Individuals that were once vicious enemies of rival 
paramilitary organizations are now sharing a common platform and channel their disagreement 
through dialogue. Nevertheless, the case of the Irish language is, in turn, a reminder of the limits of 
the integrationist approach and the importance of a certain level of autonomy as advocated by 
consociationalists. The attempt by some integrationists to use an expanded linguistic policy as a 
means of accommodating diversity and expanding the Northern Irish identity is, to a large extent, 
futile. Such an approach clearly underestimates the historical context and how politically divisive 
the issue actually is. Although the likelihood of such a linguistic expansion actually shifting 
identities is unknown and open to speculation, the overtime trend when it comes to the number of 
speakers is irrefutable. The Irish language in Northern Ireland has not shown any significant 
increase in the number of speakers and a considerable part of public opinion remains rather 
skeptical of the prospect of full linguistic integration. The political context makes the 
implementation of a language act particularly challenging; the low number of speakers means that 
there little room to excuse such public expenditure under the pretext of utility. The problems that 
arise from the need to recruit bilingual staff are obvious: the need for Irish speakers in the civil 
service would undoubtedly destabilize the sectarian balance by hiring a disproportionate amount of 
Catholic Irish speakers. Additionally, the act would not be likely to change the number of speakers 
which is currently decreasing. Even in the case of Scotland, the number of total Gaelic speakers has 
decreased between 2001 and 2011, despite the language act (Scotland Census 2001; Scotland Census 
2011). Some of the tools present under the Good Friday Agreement that are based on consociational 
principles of linguistic autonomy and proportional representation have so far served the peace 
process well. Maintaining a public body for the representation of Irish speaker in addition to 
allocating funds for the promotion of the language and allowing catholic children to be educated in 
Irish as is currently the case is an acceptable compromise for both communities. The gaps and 
vagueness of the Agreement when it comes to these issues should be addressed with great care. As 
the most recent electoral campaign has clearly demonstrated, the Irish language remains a divisive 
and polarizing issue that we, as academics, ought to take into account.  
 
All in all, it is important for academics to take political developments into consideration; 
finding false comfort in theoretical assumptions while being disconnected from ongoing incidents 
and circumstances inadvertently leads to empirical imprecisions. The Northern Irish case presents 
a clear message for a nuanced theoretical approach, open to empirical findings; none of the two 
frameworks as they are currently advocated has the possibility to fully address the shortcomings of 
the Agreement. It is equally irrational for consociationalists to argue against educational 
integration when there is a clear potential for ameliorating peace as it is for integrationsits to 
ignore the historical and political context in order to push for more inclusive linguistic policy. As 
Northern Ireland gradually recovers from this vicious conflict, acknowledging what is realistically 
achievable all while exploiting openings to solidify peace is the ideal way forward. 
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